

CLAUDIA CAO

*Creation and Birth in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein  
and Its Contemporary Rewritings*

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ABSTRACT: This contribution aims first to illustrate the indissolubility in *Frankenstein* of the two levels of form and meaning – body of the text and body of the Thing – and to highlight the symmetries between the two levels of discourse in order to demonstrate the centrality of the generative-creative process in reference both to the act of textual production and to the identity definition of the creature. Next, it will examine the hypotext's paradigmatic function for the two contemporary rewritings, *Poor Things* by Alasdair Gray and *Frankissstein* by Jeanette Winterson, which take the hypotext's narrative strategies and thematic implications to the extreme. The analysis intends to highlight to what extent the shared features in their textual construction (fragmentation, Chinese box structure, and open endings) constitute the symbolic correlative of the Thing's body. By adopting the narratological paradigm proposed by Winnett (1990), based on the key role of the experience of birth, the essay analyses the dialectical tension between the narrating voices and the function of the open ending in relation to the ineffability of the Thing's body.

KEYWORDS: *Frankenstein*, Monster, Birth, *Poor Things*, *Frankissstein*, A Love Story.

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*1. A birth-based narratological paradigm*

In her contribution on narratology, gender, and pleasure principle, Susan Winnett<sup>1</sup> starts from Peter Brooks's famous proposal of a Freudian narratological scheme (*Reading for the Plot*, 1984)<sup>2</sup> to illustrate to what extent a novel such as Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (1818)<sup>3</sup> violates this paradigm.

Brooks's psychoanalytical model is based on the Freudian theory delineated in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*<sup>4</sup>: according to Brooks, a text – similarly to human life – is ruled by an ordering principle in which a Masterplot can be found. He defines a Masterplot as a coherent system composed by the three traditional parts of any narration: incipit, development, and ending. The conclusion, according to this view, coincides with a state of final stillness, a moment of satisfaction of the desire, that is, the propulsive driving force of the plot. The scheme, therefore, provides for a retroactive reading which, in the light of the ending, allows the reader to tie together all the events and textual elements from the beginning to the conclusion, and make sense of them.

As observed by Winnett, the perspective adopted by Brooks is centred on the Freudian dynamic of exclusively male desire and pleasure; thus, it conveys a

traditional view of the plot, conventionally conceived by Western narratology as structured in three stages. The textual beginning has the function of activating a driving force which pushes the text forward (this is the moment of the arousal of desire), while the middle section is the one which leads to a climax, often through the repetition and reproduction of events. Only after this stage can a final denouement take place.

Winnett starts from these observations to illustrate the way in which, on a structural level, novels like Shelley's *Frankenstein* violate the Freudian Masterplot model, preventing the reader to gain full control of the plot and its meaning. *Frankenstein* is one of the texts which exemplifies the relativity of the traditional narratological paradigm, which is solely based on male sexual dynamics and orgasmic rhythm. Therefore, it is less valid if one tries to apply the same principles of incipience, repetition, and closure to experiences of the female body, such as birth and breastfeeding<sup>5</sup>. Although in several aspects these experiences of the female body do not deviate from the Freudian dynamic pattern – given, for instance, the shared presence of repetition – it is the function of the conclusion which changes. These experiences do not culminate in that condition of quiescence meant as 'closure' or 'death' as in the Freudian reading of the plot, and therefore cannot lead to the retrospective reading envisaged by Brooks's paradigm. The paradigm Winnett is examining establishes a new relationship between beginning and end, since the end, like an act of childbirth, is projected towards the future and not retrospectively, back towards the beginning of the path.

The case of birth and the generation of new life is essential for understanding not only the structural but also the thematic level of Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*, which I will also examine here in terms of its paradigmatic function for its rewrites. If we consider gestation and birth as relational and transformative events *par excellence*, moments of identity fusion<sup>6</sup>, which necessarily foreground the bodily identification between creator and creature, it is noticeable that these processes of identity 'con-fusion' take place on three levels in Shelley's work and rewritings. Firstly, on the level of narration and discourse there is an overlapping of narrators that gradually renders the voices of the narrating figures (be they fictional authors, editors, or other characters) and the boundaries among them indistinguishable. On the structural level it can be recognised as a Chinese box structure, where the diegetic embedding of the story within the story never leads to a real conclusion or Masterplot, emphasising the open endings and amplifying the multiplicity of fragments which compose the whole story. Finally, the same can be noticed on the

thematic and situational levels, which regard the relationships among characters. In fact, beginnings and endings, birth and death in *Frankenstein* and its rewritings are also closely interrelated and concern the generation of new 'creatures' in the protagonists' experiments<sup>7</sup>. After Shelley's work, which features the motif of the vital breath given by Victor Frankenstein to human remains in order to generate his Thing, the same motif can be found in Alasdair Gray's neo-Victorian rewrite *Poor Things* (1992)<sup>8</sup> – in which the same galvanisation techniques are used to restore Victoria McCandless's life by transplanting the brain of her foetus into her head – and in Jeanette Winterson's *Frankissstein* (2019)<sup>9</sup>, in which the transhumanist scientist Victor Stein conducts experiments in order to restore life to his deceased colleague Jack, an artificial intelligence expert. Jack's head has been cryopreserved and it is therefore still possible to scan and map his brain, transforming it into digital memory and converting it into gigabytes, thus restoring his identity and consciousness along with his life.

This contribution aims first to illustrate the indissolubility in *Frankenstein* of the two levels of form and meaning – body of the text and body of the Thing – and to highlight the symmetries between the two levels of discourse in order to demonstrate the centrality of the generative-creative process in reference both to the act of textual production and to the identity definition of the creature. Next, I will examine the hypotext's paradigmatic function for the two contemporary rewritings, *Poor Things* by Alasdair Gray and *Frankissstein* by Jeanette Winterson, which take the hypotext's narrative strategies and thematic implications to the extreme. In *Frankenstein*, the impossibility of defining a Masterplot on the structural level reflects the content level's depiction of the impossibility of dominating and understanding the ineffable monstrosity of Victor's creature. Just so, in the rewritings the same textual construction reflects different forms of otherness, of perturbing monstrosity, which the *logos*, the narrative discourse, is not yet able to dominate<sup>10</sup>.

What changes in the passage from Shelley's *Frankenstein* to the two rewritings are the reasons for this ineffability of monstrosity, which is reflected in the conflict between the narrating figures: if, as Punter affirms, it is true that in cultural terms monsters and simulacra produced by the Gothic and Neo-Gothic fiction are an expression of the fears of the society that produces them, and that on a symbolic level they have a cathartic function, as scapegoats<sup>11</sup>, in all three of these works it is first and foremost the preternatural ambition of the three creators (Victor Frankenstein, Godwin Baxter, Victor Stein) that is highlighted, as well as the

dissolution of borders between human and divine, between life and death, caused by this ambition. Moreover, the two rewritings further develop the ideological spheres around the monstrosity of the creatures: in the case of Gray's neo-Victorian novel, the moral level is emphasised, while Winterson's work, as in much of her other narrative and non-fiction production<sup>12</sup>, questions gender binarism and explores how experimentation in the transhuman sphere may lead to the dissolution of the relationship among identity, body, and mind.

## *2. Gray and Winterson's rewritings*

The formal structure of Shelley's *Frankenstein* is composed by two prefaces – one signed by P. B. Shelley and one by the author Mary – and a narrative organised in frames resulting from the overlapping of three narrators. Robert Walton, the main narrator of the story, reports via letters to his sister the events experienced by Victor Frankenstein. The doctor's own narration is also in the first person and contains «the innermost core of the Chinese boxes»<sup>13</sup>, the creature's embedded narrative, as reported by Victor Frankenstein to Walton. Victor's narration continues until his death. The concluding pages, then, turn back to the Arctic at the 'present' time, when Walton had first started telling the story.

Walton's last letter, however, ends with the words of the creature, who hints that the events as reported by Victor may later be retold and revised from the Thing's perspective:

Farewell, Frankenstein! If thou wert yet alive, and yet cherished a desire of revenge against me, it would be better satiated in my life than in my destruction. But it was not so; thou didst seek my extinction that I might not cause greater wretchedness; and if yet, in some mode unknown to me, thou hast not ceased to think and feel, thou wouldst not desire against me a vengeance greater than that which I feel. Blasted as thou wert, my agony was still superior to thine; for the bitter sting of remorse will not cease to rankle in my wounds until death shall close them for ever<sup>14</sup>.

Instead of a retrospective reading of the story in the light of the ending, as predicted by Brooks's theory, the concluding pages correspond to an opening, to a deferral of both meaning and conclusion, which inaugurates the possibility of a new version of events, a new beginning, from the opposite perspective to that received by Walton. Such diegetic embedding of the story within the story highlights the role of repetition towards the delay of an absolute truth instead of towards the achievement of a climax and a conclusive stillness. It is what Claudia Corti has called a condition of «dubitative suspension», a «continuous, obsessive display of

a [...] narrative difficulty» that generates a «tense and repulsive [...] relationship [...] of the author towards her literary creation, and of the narrator towards the narrated»<sup>15</sup>.

*Frankenstein*'s textual strategy, the conflictual condition between the author and the subjects of the story and «the degree of intensity of this conflict [...] involving the narrating figures»<sup>16</sup> thus generate a series of narrative gaps in the structure of the work that do not allow a full control of the plot for either the author or the narratees. For these reasons, following Beth Newman's suggestion, it can be asserted that it is a narrative not so much aimed at bringing attention to a single narrative plot as to «the relations between the stories in the centre and those in the frame, and listen to the dialogue between the voices that speak them»<sup>17</sup>. The result of this textual strategy is a fusion of narrating voices' identities, for which the distinctive lines among them are blurred: it is what Newman calls an «extended ventriloquism, a word-for-word repetition of another's speaker discourse, [...] [which] further blurs the distinction between the voices of its narrators»<sup>18</sup>.

In the rewritings, too, there is a *mise en abyme* of the act of writing which, as in Shelley's hypertext, amplifies the sense of fragmentariness and lacunarity, which undermines any possibility of finding a Masterplot that holds together the different structural levels of the text: in the case of *Poor Things*, the (fictional) editor of the volume *Episodes from the Early Life of a Scottish Public Health Officer* (1909) is Alasdair Gray, whose name corresponds to the name of the (real) author himself. His writing largely transcribes Bella Baxter's story as it was recorded in the manuscript produced by her husband, the physician Archibald McCandless. The latter, however, had partly received the information from his master – already deceased by the time McCandless had commenced writing the novel – Dr Godwin Baxter, whose experiments supposedly restored Bella's life after her suicide. The editor Gray also publishes the letter which Bella herself – signing with her first name, Victoria – had appended to her husband's volume and addressed to a potential unborn grandchild, to disprove Archibald's reconstruction of her origins and identity. This letter is followed by a fictional apparatus of critical notes by the editor Gray, supposedly based on archival research aiming to corroborate Dr McCandless's version.

The authenticity of McCandless's version, however, is undermined by a few important details as soon as he is introduced: the discovery of the original volume is due to Glasgow historian Michael Connelly – excluded from the narrative – and the very circumstances of this discovery in the 1970s are reported second-hand by

the editor Gray. Moreover, there is clear tension between the characters, due not only to the lack of agreement between the two regarding the reliability of the events narrated<sup>19</sup>, but also to the loss of the original volume, for which Donnelly blames Gray, along with the impossibility of finding McCandless's marriage and death certificates. These are all elements which from the very first pages undermine Archibald McCandless's reliability as an author and researcher<sup>20</sup>. Bella/Victoria's letter, which not only stages the tension between the three narrating figures – Godwin, McCandless, Victoria – but also definitively prevents any possibility of arriving at a Masterplot, is the second. Just as in *Frankenstein*, it is the multiplicity of frames that serves this function.

In this novel, too, the conclusion corresponds to a new beginning, a new version of the story that prevents any retrospective reading of the work, and only authorises a reading of the same plot from a perspective opposite that of the first narrator. Further emphasising this *mise en abyme* of the tale, and the multiplicity of textual fragments which composes Gray's novel is also its intrinsic intermediality, given by the display and incorporation of a multiplicity of graphic and visual texts, such as the original letters sent by Bella during her travels, and William Strang's etchings, depicting the medical experimentation which eventually generated Bella Baxter («[...] it was McCandless who filled spaces in his book with illustrations from the first edition of Gray's Anatomy: probably because he and his friend Baxter learned the kindly art of healing from it<sup>21</sup>»).

In the case of Jeanette Winterson's *Frankissstein* the ventriloquism and fusion of voices originates first and foremost from the absorption of Mary Shelley's own voice: the events linked to the genesis of *Frankenstein* in 1818 and an expansion of the novel's plot alternate with the events set in 2018 between Memphis and Manchester, starting from a robotics convention dedicated to the bi-centennial celebration of the novel, and attended by the transsexual protagonist Ry Shelley. Through the alternation of the two narratives and through graphic choices similar to those observed in Gray's text – such as the change of font or the use of italics to show the fusion of different sources – the dialogism between the hypotext and the rewriting is made explicit. Furthermore, the pastiche of sources allows the reader to identify once again the union of fact and fiction, given the use of biographical information relating to Mary Shelley herself, her mother Mary Wollestonecraft, her husband P. B. Shelley, and his previous wife, who committed suicide during her pregnancy.

What amplifies this dialectic between fact and fiction is the author's voice in the concluding note:

This story is *an invention that sits inside another invention* – reality itself. Alcor is a real place. So is Manchester. So was Bedlam. The tunnels under Manchester are there – but not quite as I have described them. Some characters in this story existed, or still do. Others are fictions. None of the conversations took place in the way that they appear here – or perhaps at all. I hope I have caused no offence to the living or to the dead. This is a story<sup>22</sup>.

As in the two previous novels, the insertion of a further textual level not only stresses the tension between fictional and real narrating figures, but also emphasises the degree of diegetic embedding generated by the explicit dialogism between hypotext and rewriting (*an invention that sits inside another invention*), already highlighted by the narrator, Ry Shelley («Is it not strange how life imitates art?»<sup>23</sup>).

On the thematic level, what changes in the passage from Shelley's *Frankenstein* to the rewritings are the reasons for this uncanny relationship between the protagonist and the monstrous entity, characterised by a constant elicitation of contradictory feelings, from seductive fascination<sup>24</sup> to repulsion.

In all three cases the subjects of the narration are the preternatural ambition of the three creators (Frankenstein, Baxter, Stein), the dissolution of borders between the human and the divine, and consequently between life and death. However, what changes in the two rewritings are the semantic implications called into question by the monstrosity of the Things, whose identities are ontologically fluid and relational due to the different components from which they originate<sup>25</sup>. In Alasdair Gray's neo-Victorian novel, the fascination exercised by Bella Baxter speaks to the moral level. Bella turns out to be the emblem of the freest and most dissolute erotic pleasure («She is now quite sex-mad—an erotomaniac, to use the older term—and tries to hide it under prim language which shows she is still, at heart, a subject of Queen Victoria. Cuddles is her word for love-making, she calls fornication wedding»<sup>26</sup>). Her behaviour belies the apparent and expected realisation of the Victorian ideals of feminine purity and innocence, suggested by her generation through the transplantation into her head of the brain of her own foetus, which as such creates – in those who know the secret of her origin – an expectation of innocence and childlike purity embodied in the body of an adult woman («She had the soul of an innocent child within the form of a Circassian houri-irresistible»<sup>27</sup>).

In Winterson's work, instead, there are two forms of otherness, both facets of “uncanny monstrosity” which are discussed in the context of scientific progress:

the first concerns the demolition of the borders within gender binarism and involves the fascinating figure of Ry Shelly, who identifies as a hybrid, cuspid, and transsexual, but who also represents, due to their gender fluidity, a «transsexual monster [...], a non-subject [...] part of the ‘inappropriate/d others’ (Haraway 1992)»<sup>28</sup>. Think of the episode of the attempted rape by a man attracted to their male features but who, upon discovering the presence of female genitalia, rants, «YOU FUCKIN’ FREAK! YOU HAD YOUR TIT SLASHED OFF? NO TITS. NO DICK. FUCKIN’ FREAK!»<sup>29</sup>. The second form of monstrosity in Winterson’s novel involves another crossing of borders, those among identity, mind, and body, through the experiments of the transhumanist scientist Victor Stein. However, neither the readers nor the narrator Ry Shelley are made aware of the results of his experiments and this strand of the plot is deliberately left open. In this case too, the concluding suspension refers us back to the open ending of *Frankenstein*, to the moment of final disappearance of the Thing in the ocean. In both cases «the visual loss of the monster [is] a symbolic correlative of the linguistic defeat of the narrator: escaping an exhaustive conclusion [...] it avoids the control of the bewildered, ‘hesitant’, narrator»<sup>30</sup>. In *Poor Things* the same effect of openness, suspension, and inaccessibility around Bella Baxter’s true identity is also generated by Victoria/Bella’s concluding letter: despite the editor’s attempt to contain and limit the destabilising power of her biographical account through the final critical notes, the letter contributes to emphasising the failure of the discourse in relation to the ineffability which her monstrosity represents, that of a female social model unimaginable and unacceptable within the Victorian society to which she belongs. Indeed, Bella with her own letter also signifies the attempt of a Victorian woman to step out of the social role of victim, and to rewrite a social, ideological and cultural text for herself<sup>31</sup>.

### *3. Conclusion*

The starting point of this analysis was the premise that the structural and content level – body of the text and body of the Thing – in *Frankenstein* and its rewritings are indissoluble. In these works, the constant openness of discourse towards new beginnings and the impossibility of reaching an absolute meaning and a definitive truth express the limits and failure of speech and discourse when facing the ineffability of these monstrous, fluid, and relational creatures. At the same time, the tension between narrating figures, the multiplication of narrating voices unable to achieve a hegemonic position is also indicative of the degree of uncanny tension

caused by the creature generated by the protagonists. Just as in Shelley's *Frankenstein*, «the innermost core of the Chinese boxes»<sup>32</sup> is the creature's embedded narrative, which by its very position in the core of the frames suggests the distance which the author wants to place between herself and the creature's voice, so also in Gray's novel we can observe the process of confinement of Bella Baxter/Victoria McCandless's voice. Her letter is confined within three male narratives, as a proof and confirmation on the structural level of what happens on the level of content: the attempt of the male figures who surround her to dominate and control the uncanniness and monstrosity that she represents.

In Winterson's *Frankissstein*, as Ciompi observes<sup>33</sup>, Stein's transhumanist experimentation does not end in a true advancement but leaves open the possibility of still indeterminable results. In this case, as well, the impossibility to determine an outcome stresses the ineffability of this bodiless identity to which the experimentation on artificial intelligence could lead in the extreme.

Indeed, in *Frankenstein* and its rewritings, the body of the text and the body of the Thing lie side by side along an imitative, permeable and fluid border. The dissolution of the boundaries between narrating voices and the structural fragments of the narratives reflects the fluid and relational character of the monstrous identities. On a structural level, the opening and suspension of the discourse creates narratives projected towards new beginnings, new indeterminable possibilities which the narrative discourse cannot yet adequately tell and narrate.

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<sup>1</sup> S. Winnett, *Coming Unstrung: Women, Men, Narrative, and Principles of Pleasure*, in «PMLA», vol. 103, n. 3, May 1990, pp. 505-518.

<sup>2</sup> P. Brooks, *Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative*, Cambridge (MA)-London, Harvard University Press, 1984.

<sup>3</sup> M. Shelley, *Frankenstein, Or the Modern Prometheus* (1818), ed. P. Hunter, New York- London, Norton and Company, 1996.

<sup>4</sup> S. Freud, *Jenseits des Lustprinzips* (1920), Eng trans. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology and Other Works*, ed. J. Strachey, London, The Hogarth Press, pp. 3-64.

<sup>5</sup> S. Winnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 509-510.

<sup>6</sup> R. Prezzo, *Trame di nascita. Tra miti, filosofie, immagini e racconti*, Bergamo, Moretti e Vitali, 2023.

<sup>7</sup> P. Youngquist, *Frankenstein: The Mother, the Daughter, and the Monster*, in «Philological Quarterly», vol. 70, n. 3, Summer 1991, pp. 339-59.

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- <sup>8</sup> A. Gray, *Poor Things. Episodes from the Early Life of Archibald McCandless M.D. Scottish Public Health Officer*. Edited by Alasdair Gray, London-Oxford-New York-New Delhi-Sydney, Bloomsbury, 2002 [1992].
- <sup>9</sup> J. Winterson, *Frankissstein: A Love Story*, London, Vintage, 2019.
- <sup>10</sup> See J. Winterson, *op. cit.*, p. 59: «For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within; why may we not say, that all Automata (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life?».
- <sup>11</sup> D. Punter, *A Companion to the Gothic*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2000, p. 124.
- <sup>12</sup> Among her publications see also the novel *Written on the Body*, New York, Vintage International, 1994 [1992], and the memoir *Why Be Happy When You Could Be Normal?*, Toronto, Alfred Knopf, 2011.
- <sup>13</sup> D. Hoeveler, *Fantasy, Trauma, and Gothic Daughters: Frankenstein as Therapy*, in «Prism(s): Essays in Romanticism», n. 8, 2000, pp. 7-28; p. 17.
- <sup>14</sup> M. Shelley, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-56.
- <sup>15</sup> C. Corti, *Sul discorso fantastico. La narrazione nel romanzo gotico*, Pisa, ETS, 1989, p. 113. My translation.
- <sup>16</sup> Ivi, p. 113.
- <sup>17</sup> B. Newman, *Narratives of Seduction and the Seductions of Narrative: The Frame Structure of Frankenstein*, in «English Literary History [ELH]», n. 53, 1986, pp. 166-90; pp. 166-67.
- <sup>18</sup> Ivi, p. 146.
- <sup>19</sup> See Gray, *op. cit.*, p. xxxi: «I also told Donnelly that I had written enough fiction to know history when I read it. He said he had written enough history to recognize fiction. To this there was only one reply – I had to become a historian». On the reasons about the ways in which he lost the original copy of the book see p. xv: «Michael Donnelly has told me he would find the above evidence more convincing if I had obtained official copies of the marriage and death certificates and photocopies of the newspaper reports, but if my readers trust me I do not care what an “expert” thinks. Mr. Donnelly is no longer as friendly as formerly. He blames me for the loss of the original volume, which is unfair. I would gladly have sent a photocopy to the publisher and returned the original, but that would have added at least £300 to the production costs. Modern typesetters can “scan” a book into their machine from a typed page, but from a photocopy must type it in all over again; moreover the book was needed by a photographic specialist, to make plates from which the Strang etchings and facsimiles of Bella’s letter could be reproduced. Somewhere between editor, publisher, typesetter and photographer the unique first edition was mislaid. These mistakes are continually happening in book production, and nobody regrets them more than I do».
- <sup>20</sup> See Gray, *op. cit.*, p. xiii: «I also told Donnelly that I had written enough fiction to know history when I read it. He said he had written enough history to recognize fiction. To this there was only one reply – I had to become a historian».
- <sup>21</sup> A. Gray, *op. cit.*, p. xvi.
- <sup>22</sup> J. Winterson, *Frankissstein*, *cit.*, p. 345. Emphasis is mine.
- <sup>23</sup> Ivi, p. 288.
- <sup>24</sup> B. Newman, *op. cit.*

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- <sup>25</sup> While Frankenstein's creature takes on a new identity in relation to the individual human components of which it is composed, in the case of the two rewritings the creatures are the result of the union of fragments that can largely be traced back to the same body: in Gray's novel *Bella Baxter* originates from the fusion of the identity of her unborn child and Victoria's body, whose impulses are still present; in Winterson's work *Ry Shelley* is a fusion of male and female elements, while the mind which Stein is trying to bring back to life is the result of the scanning of a head without the rest of the body.
- <sup>26</sup> A. Gray, *op. cit.*, p. 308.
- <sup>27</sup> Ivi, p. 215. See also E. Ionoaia, *The Gothic Fear/Failure of Reproduction in Neo-Victorian Fiction*, in *The Challenges of Communication. Contexts and Strategies in the World of Globalism*, ed. I. Boldea, C. Sigmirean, D.M. Buda Târgu Mureș, Arhipelag XXI Press, 2018, p. 238.
- <sup>28</sup> F. Ciompi, *The Future of Humans in a Post-Human World. "Frankissstein" by Jeanette Winterson*, in *Entering the Simulacra World*, ed. A. Ghezzani, L. Giovannelli, F. Rossi, C. Savettieri, «Between», vol. XII, n. 24, 2022, pp. 165-182; p. 170.
- <sup>29</sup> J. Winterson, *Frankissstein*, *op. cit.*, p. 242.
- <sup>30</sup> C. Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 128. My translation.
- <sup>31</sup> C. March, *Bella and the Beast (and a Few Dragons, Too): Alasdair Gray and the Social Resistance of the Grotesque*, in «Critique», 43, 4, Summer 2002, pp. 323-346; p. 343.
- <sup>32</sup> D. Hoeveler, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
- <sup>33</sup> F. Ciompi, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

