



# Branding the City Through Mediterranean Identity: Local Cosmopolitan Ideologies and Narratives of Exclusion in Napoli, Marseille and Rijeka

Emilio Cocco<sup>a</sup>; Pietro Sabatino<sup>b</sup>; Marianna Ragone<sup>c</sup>;

(a) Università degli studi di Teramo, [ecocco@unite.it](mailto:ecocco@unite.it), ORCID: 0000-0002-0537-7267

(b) Università degli studi di Napoli, [pietro.sabatino@unina.it](mailto:pietro.sabatino@unina.it), ORCID: 0000-0002-3538-6201

(c) Università di Roma Tre, [marianna.ragone@uniroma3.it](mailto:marianna.ragone@uniroma3.it), ORCID: 0000-0001-5594-6201

To cite this article: Cocco, E.; Sabatino, P.; Ragone, M. (2022), Branding the City Through Mediterranean Identity: Local Cosmopolitan Ideologies and Narratives of Exclusion in Napoli, Marseille and Rijeka, *Fuori Luogo. Rivista di Sociologia del Territorio, Turismo, Tecnologia*, 13(3), 33 – 47. DOI: 10.6093/2723-9608/9226

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.6093/2723-9608/9226>



Submission date: 10/06/2022

Revised: 16/11/2022

Published: 23/12/2022

## ABSTRACT

### Branding the City Through Mediterranean Identity: Local Cosmopolitan Ideologies and Narratives of Exclusion in Napoli, Marseille and Rijeka

The Mediterranean identity is becoming an intriguing tool for city authorities willing to implement policies of urban regeneration all over the basin. More specifically, all around the Mediterranean coast, independently on the national and local features, many cities are branding their identity as a “Mediterranean one” to promote gentrification projects, attract investments, develop tourism and re-shape their cultural identity for the global scene. In our paper, we are going to investigate the main common characters of this Mediterranean branding process by comparing three cases of very different Mediterranean cities: Napoli, Marseille and Rijeka. These cities are peripherally located within their national territories and although part of quite diverse nation-building process, they are all targets of regeneration policies that exploit their maritime immaterial and material heritage, usually emphasized by “big events” (such as ECOC in Marseille 2013 and Rijeka 2020, or the America’s cup in Napoli). Thus, our aim is twofold: on one hand we shall point out the common ideological features of this regeneration-oriented Mediterranean narrative by focusing on and deconstructing the driving concept of local cosmopolitanism. On the other one, we will explore the practices of exclusion hidden behind this Mediterranean narrative by stressing the unspoken discard and removal of some undesired people, histories and heritage from the picture of regeneration. Our investigation is based on the quantitative and qualitative analysis of tourist masterplans, city sponsored cultural promotion materials and audio-visual advertisements of the city. Also, visual ethnography of the urban beaches, port-areas and waterfronts aimed at detecting and quantifying landmarks, signs and symbols of the Mediterranean-ess.

## KEYWORDS

Mediterranean  
Cosmopolitanism  
City brand  
Maritime  
Exclusion

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.serena.unina.it/index.php/fuoriluogo/about>



Submit your article to this journal

<http://www.serena.unina.it/index.php/fuoriluogo/about/submissions>



REDAZIONE@FUORILUOGO.INFO



+39 081 2535883



FUORILUOGO



RIVISTA FUORI LUOGO

Special Issue Place Branding

# FUORI LUOGO

Rivista di Sociologia  
del Territorio, Turismo, Tecnologia

*Guest Editors*

**Paola de Salvo**

Università degli studi di Perugia

**Marco Pizzi**

Università degli studi di Perugia

**Pablo Gómez Iniesta**

Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha

**Juan Luis Manfredi-Sánchez**

Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha



Direttore Fabio Corbisiero  
Caporedattore Carmine Urciuoli

ANNO VI - Volume 13 - Numero 3 - Dicembre 2022  
FedOA - Federico II University Press  
ISSN (online) 2723 - 9608 - ISSN (print) 2532 - 750X

## **EDITORE**



FedOA - Federico II University Press  
Centro di Ateneo per le Biblioteche "Roberto Pettorino"  
Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II

## **Responsabilità editoriale**

Fedoa adotta e promuove specifiche linee guida in tema di responsabilità editoriale, e segue le COPE's Best Practice Guidelines for Journal Editors.

Autorizzazione del Tribunale di Napoli n. 59 del 20 dicembre 2016.

Direttore responsabile: Carmine Urcioli

ISSN 2723-9608 (pubblicazione on line)

ISSN 2532-750X (pubblicazione cartacea)

## Sommario

### 9. *Editorial*

Place Branding: Connecting Tourist Experiences to Territories  
Fabio Corbisiero

11. Paola de Salvo, Marco Pizzi  
Pablo Gómez Iniesta, Juan Luis Manfredi-Sánchez

## Contributi

15. City Branding and Place Branding in the Metaverse:  
how real cities build their virtual image and how virtual cities do it  
Pavel Sidorenko Bautista

33. Branding the City through Mediterranean Identity:  
Local Cosmopolitan Ideologies and Narratives of Exclusion in Napoli, Marseille, and Rijeka  
Emilio Cocco, Pietro Sabatino, Marianna Ragone

49. The role of Destination Management Organizations in co-creating local territory brand identity:  
a comparative analysis in Italy and Argentina  
Mario Coscarello, Ida Ruffolo

65. The rhetoric of development in rural areas:  
the branding places processes in the earthquake-affected Central Apennines  
Davide Olori, Enrico Mariani

79. Family storytelling and local development  
Tullio Romita, Antonella Perri

89. Place Branding in the Gastro-populist Age.  
Navigating through Giorgia Meloni's and Matteo Salvini's exploitation of the symbolic nature of food  
Giovanni Starita

107. Neighborhood branding and residents' engagement:  
evidences from NoLo - in Milan - to TomTom - in Istanbul  
Silvia Mugnano, Özlem Tepeli Türel, Alessandra Terenzi

123. "Damn, Norway": Place Branding as a Function of Local Campaigns and Global Actors  
Jessica Yarin Robinson

141. Visual narratives for local development. understanding local development  
through local place branding: an Italian case  
Paola de Salvo, Marco Pizzi

157. Attractiveness and Coastal Cities in Southern Italy.  
Flows and Consumption of International Tourists in Naples, Bari, Cagliari, Messina and Reggio Calabria  
Carlo Colloca, Licia Lipari

171. The UNESCO Serial Property of Arab-Norman Palermo.  
An Assessment from a Sustainable Development Perspective  
Mariaclaudia Cusumano

## SEZIONI A 3T - LETTURE FUORI LUOGO

183. Levine, Myron. A. 2020. *Urban Politics*. New York: Routledge.  
Antonio Alejo

185. Bill Baker. *Place branding for small cities, regions and downtowns: the essential for successful destinations*. Independently published, 2019  
Mariavittoria Cicellin

187. Trejo Nieto, A., Niño Amézquita, J.L. (2021).  
*Metropolitan governance in Latin America*. Abingdon: Routledge.  
Pablo Gómez Iniesta

## SEZIONI A 3T - INCONTRO FUORI LUOGO

191. Territorial Governance and Place Branding. Interview with Olga Kolotouchkina  
Marco Damiani

## SEZIONE FUORI LUOGO

197. University, Peripheral Neighbourhoods and Social Innovation: the Case of 'Rete 3B' in Milan  
Luca Bottini, Monica Bernardi

211. Participatory practices in energy transition in Italy. For a co-productive, situated and relational analysis  
Monica Musolino

227. Perceptions and Attitudes Towards the Use of Treated Wastewater in Agriculture a  
Case Study from Beit Dajan Community, West Bank  
Elena Giacomelli, Pierluigi Musarò, Valentina Cappi

# **Branding the City through Mediterranean Identity: Local Cosmopolitan Ideologies and Narratives of Exclusion in Napoli, Marseille, and Rijeka<sup>2</sup>**

## **Introduction**

The Mediterranean identity is becoming an intriguing tool for city authorities willing to implement policies of urban regeneration all over the basin. More specifically, all around the Mediterranean coast, independently on the national and local features, many cities are branding their identity as a “Mediterranean one” to promote gentrification projects, attract investments, develop tourism and re-shape their cultural identity for the global scene. In our paper, we are going to investigate the main common characters of this Mediterranean branding process by comparing three cases of very different Mediterranean cities: Napoli, Marseille and Rijeka. These cities are peripherally located within their national territories and although part of quite diverse nation-building process, they are all targets of regeneration policies that exploit their maritime immaterial and material heritage, usually emphasized by “big events” (such as ECOC in Marseille 2013 and Rijeka 2020, or the America’s cup in Napoli). Thus, our aim is twofold: on one hand we shall point out the common ideological features of this regeneration-oriented Mediterranean narrative by focusing on and deconstructing the driving concept of local cosmopolitanism. On the other one, we will explore the practices of exclusion hidden behind this Mediterranean narrative by stressing the unspoken discard and removal of some undesired people, histories and heritage from the picture of regeneration. Our investigation is based on the analysis of tourist masterplans, city sponsored cultural promotion materials and audio-visual advertisements of the city. Also, we rely on the visual ethnography of the urban beaches, port-areas and waterfronts aimed at detecting and quantifying landmarks, signs and symbols of the Mediterranean-ess.

## **1. Theoretical background**

Back in 1989, Frank Broeze described the multifold nature of humans relations to the sea through several categories, including the use of the sea for natural resources, transporting goods and people, power projection, scientific explorations, leisure, and cultural inspiration (Broeze, 1989). But the relation to the sea involves deeper implications from the point of view of collective representations, and Stefan Helmreich more recently provided an original insight into the interdependence of nature, culture, and seawater. (Helmreich, 2009) To Helmreich seawater is more than a material asset as it works as a theory machine: namely, water in nature “moves faster than in culture”, thus it needs to be channeled and landed. Accordingly, it should be utilized for cultivation, both in the material forms of agriculture and the symbolic aspects of culture. Therefore, flexibility and mutability in nature bring about the same features in the cultural field, providing a common ground for meaning constructions. For example, from this standpoint, what we call globalization could be also named “oceanization,” and such a fluid ontology is not “neutral”, but it reflects a culturally specific vision. Particularly, it portrays a representation of an unbounded, wild ocean to be closed in cultural forms, which eventually reminds us of colonial projects of keeping the high seas “free”, outside sovereign territorializations.

1 Emilio Cocco, Università degli studi di Teramo, ecocco@unite.it, ORCID:0000-0002-0537-7267; Pietro Sabatino Università degli Studi di Napoli, pietro.sabatino@unina.it, ORCID:0000-0002-3538-6201; Marianna Ragone, Università di Roma Tre, marianna.ragone@uniroma3.it, ORCID: 0000-0001-5594-8446.

2 Received: 10/06/2022. Revised: 16/11/2022. Accepted: 30/11/2022.

Such long standing process of cultural subjugation of seawater is clearly identified by Karl Schmitt, who emphasized the practices of discovery, voyage, and conquest of the oceans but in the process of "translation" of society from the land to the sea that is associated with it. In other words, a real dislocation of people, societies, and institutions from the land to the moving space of the ocean, and that is the basis of the modern separation of land and sea (Schmitt, 2001). Namely, Steinberg suggests that the ambivalent status of the sea depends on the fact that seawater is neither established like a political and juridical extension of the land nor as an extra-social space freed of state power. Interestingly, the author states such a status would represent a typical Mediterranean feature because Mediterranean people historically constructed the sea: « as a non-possessable space, but one in which and across which state power legitimately could be asserted in the interest for stewarding its bounty » (Steinberg 2001, p. 61). In this perspective, the Mediterranean Sea is a special case for it does not fall within the two most typical social constructions of the Ocean-sea, the Micronesian model of ocean space as a « place of connection » and the Indian Ocean model of ocean space as a «non territory apart from society » (Ivi, pp. 52-60, 42-43, 45). Actually, the Mediterranean representation of the ocean-sea somehow portrays the ideal-type of territory most compatible with the ideology of globalization because here the sea is imagined as a smooth, flat-field both open to circulation and object of power projections. Within this representation of a Mediterranean-like ocean world, city-ports perform the most crucial function as they enable mobility and dislocations along asymmetric lines of power emerging from land-based political entities. As a matter of facts, city-ports are built, imagined, and lived as hinges between distant worlds (Del Bianco, 1982; Dubin, 199; Dassovich, 2003), hubs for different social world that meet at the border between the land and the sea, and eventually landing areas for «extremely dense, seaborne social networks allowing the circulation of people, ideas, goods and meanings» (Leontidou, 1990; Driessen, 2005, pp. 129-130). However, these encounters are not without consequences, on the contrary bring about specific outcomes in terms of radical social transformations of material and immaterial elements, constantly dislocated and relocated through symbolic exchanges between the sea and the land, and the other way around (Kidwai Atiya Habeeb, 1992, p. 10). In other words, what makes of a coastal city a veritable city-port is its capacity to materialize the "oceanization" of society, that is to say to both express and conceal the ambivalent, "Mediterranean" representation of the ocean space implied in the colonial projects. Accordingly, Mediterranean cities are often representing the best examples of the abovementioned typology as they play the main characters in the narrative of the Mediterranean maritime world described by Braudel. The French historian not surprisingly points out the interlocking role of Mediterranean coastal cities, otherwise named "mirror" cities, which thrive on the movement of people and freight.

In this picture the Mediterranean appears as a moving space produced by the interpenetration of sea-bound and land-bound opposite but concurrent trends. On the same wavelength, more recent studies emphasize the role connectivity among the micro-regions of the Mediterranean Sea, where exchanges and cooperation do not cancel out the importance diversity. Among them all, *The Corrupting Sea. A Study of Mediterranean History* by Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell (2000) has been an inspiration for a generation of new Mediterranean scholars who have focused on the interdependence of climates, languages, religions, food, etc. to the point of suggesting an idea of *Mediterranean-ness* that far from expressing backwardness and nostalgia is instead an analytical tool for understanding the complex dynamics of global society. This understanding of the Mediterranean resonates quite well with the approach of Braudel, who thinks of the Mediterranean as «*an unwieldy, complex, out-of-series character ... It escapes our usual measures*» Such is the difficulty that for some scholars the game is not worth the candle, so much so that his friend and colleague Lucien Febvre does not fail to remind Braudel that the Mediterranean was at the bottom «*a false beautiful theme*» (Fiume, 2016). The concern of Febvre is even more significant when one thinks of the many Mediterranean studies always placing the same categories at the center of their interest: tradition, honor, shame, revenge,

moral vigilance. The result of many of these scholarly investigations, often anthropologically based, is that they have unfortunately end up consolidating stereotypes of “stillness” and “archaicness” of the Mediterranean still present in public opinion and beyond. Plus, the strength of this ambivalent stereotype is such that it also spills over into the tourist representations of the region, in which dolce far niente and life made up of misery and hard work. Suffering and exile, at home in the Mediterranean since Homer’s time, end up coexisting with the uninhibited vacation of the consumer society located in ClubMed. In this sense, it is not surprising that for anthropologist Michael Herzfeld, the Mediterranean is essentially a practical sea, i.e., a methodological *passepartout* for accessing a rich array of fields of study, from the Mediterranean diet to codes of honor and shame (Herzfeld, 1984). Besides the hard-to-die positive and negative stereotypes, the Mediterranean identity is becoming an intriguing tool for city authorities willing to implement policies of urban regeneration all over the basin.

More specifically, all around the Mediterranean coast, independently on the national and local features, many cities are branding their identity as a “Mediterranean one” to promote gentrification projects, attract investments, develop tourism and re-shape their cultural identity for the global scene, and we will do so by comparing three cities, Naples, Marseille, and Rijeka. These cities were chosen, as we will see in the third section, because they share the crucial role played by the maritime element, the presence of a growing tourism industry and a presumed Mediterranean identity narrative although within different heterogenous national contexts.

In this framework, in these cities belonging to a presumed or real Mediterranean identity also plays a role in conveying policies and redistributing social, economic, and cultural capital in according with the theory of tourism gentrification (Gotham, 2005). Kevin Fox Gotham has indeed pointed out that in some urban contexts, touristification drives gentrification and both are supported by economic ambitions and political forces. The urban transformation set in motion by tourism gentrification is often accompanied by ideological justifications and a new identity that refer to the need for redevelopment of spaces, and the construction of new buildings and infrastructure.

The article will be structured in the following order: as we have already seen, the first section introduces the theoretical framework of the research, in the second one the methodology and objectives will be presented, in the third and following sub-sections the characteristics of the three cities, the elements that allowed us to select them for comparison and the analyses concerning them will be explained, in the fourth and final section the conclusions and an invitation to future research will be discussed.

## **2. Objectives and Methodology**

Through the use of the case studies of Naples, Marseille, and Rijeka, we attempt to reflect with an innovative study around the rhetoric on the Mediterranean as a symbolic practice of exclusion, but due to the scarce literature on the subject and the fact that the analytical categories, administrative practices, and laws are different in the three different contexts, the comparison is difficult and it was not possible to collect neither qualitative data such as interviews nor quantitative ones such a questionnaires.

In our investigation we assumed that the best option to compare quite diverse narratives and data on the three cities is the case study methodology, which is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2014, pp. 3-5). Particularly, case studies are the preferred method when (a) “how” or “why” questions are being posed, (b) the investigator has little control over events, and (c) the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context.

Moreover, the more that research questions seek to explain some present circumstances (i.e. "how" or "why" some social phenomenon works) the more that the case study method will be relevant. The method also is relevant the more that research questions require an extensive and "in-depth" description of some social phenomenon.

Therefore, research ranges from using secondary data, such as official statistical data, tourist masterplans, city-sponsored cultural promotion materials, audio-visual advertisements of the city, and policy statements to primary, qualitative data, such as visual ethnography, the use of photographs, and qualitative and urban observations. From this standpoint, the use of a Case Study methodology is more suitable to a situation where there are many more variables of interest than data points, the researcher relies on multiple sources of evidence and benefits from prior theoretical propositions, guiding data collection and analysis. Finally, in answering "how" and "why" questions the case study is preferred in examining contemporary events, but when the relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated. According to Yin, when dealing with case study methodology, it does not matter if research questions are exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory. The important aspect is to have a strong theoretical framework providing guidance and this is making a difference with other similar methods such as ethnography or grounded theory (Yin, 2014, pp. 11-14). Accordingly, the case study method does not urge researchers to rush to "field contact", especially when the distinction between context and phenomenon are not clear and no systematic data collection is feasible. Differently, having a choice (and resources) the multiple case design approach stands out against systematic but careless data collection as it allows for replication and brings about a drastic improvement of generalizability. Theoretical replication is even a stronger argument in this regard because strong theories can be applied to different cases to test their explanatory power. In our research path, the choice of case study was based on two strategic considerations. Firstly, the difficulty of collecting systematic data on cases that are not easily comparable as a unit of analysis. The institutional framework defining the city branding in Marseille, Naples and Rijeka is far too different to be reasonably subject to quantitative or qualitative systematic data collection and comparison. Tourism and cultural policies are in the hands of different institutions, which pursue diverse goals in quite heterogeneous contexts. Such a condition requires deeper insights into the phenomenon before making any other assumption. Secondly, our research represents one of the first attempts to produce an innovative study on the Mediterranean rhetoric as an exclusion device for branding purposes in areas that are quite distant in social, economic, political, and cultural terms. As a result, the Mediterranean category is "biased" by default because it is represented and experienced in quite different ways, thus not easily subject to operationalization in terms of survey or interview.

### **3. Marseille, Napoli, Rijeka: Port, Sea, Industrial legacy and Tourist booming as common features in diverse cities**

Case studies were selected mainly due to the simultaneous presence of similarities and profound differences in their own social and economic landscape. In fact, if the maritime element and the crucial role played by the port in local identity are common factors in Napoli, Marseille, and Rijeka, the same cannot be said for their demographic and economic dimensions, as well as for nation-building processes in the countries where the case studies are situated. Although belonging to different regions, over the last decade those cities have shared a profound process of transformation of their economy, all experiencing a boom of the tourist industry together with the decline of traditional sectors of production. Regarding a first classification of the case studies as urban spaces, undoubtedly there is a clear distinction between two metropolitan areas (Marseille and Naples) and a medium-sized city (Rijeka) even though the Croatian case presents a significant attraction capacity in terms of commuting and service locations beyond the



local dimension: taking into account NUTS3 level units<sup>3</sup>, the territory where Rijeka is included (*Primorsko-goransko zupanija*) is classified as *intermediate* in *Urban-Rural typology* and as a *Non-Metropolitan Region* in the *Metropolitan typology*<sup>4</sup>. We are clearly dealing with diverse urban spaces both in terms of number of inhabitants and density if we consider that Napoli and Marseille’s municipalities represent the center of millions of residents’ conurbation.

Tab. 1: Main geographical, demographic, economic data and classification on Marseille, Napoli and Rijeka (NUTS 3 Level, Eurostat)

	Napoli Provincia ITF 33	Marseille - Bouches-du-Rhone	Rijeka Primorsko-goransko zupanija HR031
Urban-rural typology	<i>Predominantly urban regions</i>	<i>Predominantly urban regions</i>	<i>Intermediate regions</i>
Metropolitan typology (Eurostat, NUTS 2021)	<i>Other metropolitan regions</i>	<i>Other metropolitan regions</i>	<i>Non-metropolitan regions</i>
Border typology	<i>Non-border regions</i>	<i>Non-border regions</i>	<i>Land border</i>
Inhabitants (2020)	3.034.410	2.044.355	281.945
Inhabitants <sup>5</sup> (only municipality)	948.850	877.095	108.622
Industry occupation (% of total occupation)	12,4%	7,8%	20,5%
GDP per capita, 2019, current price market	20.294	36.823	15.289
GDP per capita, 2019, current price market, with average country value =100	68	102	112
Apartments/Rooms on Airbnb (Iq 2022, only municipality)	5.972	6.523	728
% Entire Apartment on Total offer on Airbnb	67,6%	86,1%	90,9%
Apartments/Rooms on Airbnb on Iq 2022, (only municipality - IVq 2019 value =100)	71	89	78

Source: Eurostat, AirDna

The three cities share an industrial tradition, like most Mediterranean port cities, but the current weight of the industrial sector, as well as the dynamics related to the deindustrialization process are different in each of the three case studies. An overall downsizing has been occurring over the last two decades: Employment in industry fell from 10.4% in 2000 to 7.8% in 2019 in Mar-

3 The NUTS classification (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) is a hierarchical system for dividing up the economic territory of the EU and the UK for the purpose of: collection, of European regional statistics and socio-economic analyses of the regions. The 1166 NUTS 3 units are defined as small regions for specific diagnoses.

4 Both types are implemented, among others, by Eurostat to classify NUTS statistical-territorial units.

5 Values refer to the year 2019 for Marseille, 2020 for Naples, 2021 for Rijeka.

seille; from 23.7% to 20.5% in Rijeka; from 14.2% to 12.6% in Naples. Even in a common context of reduction, there is a different weight of industry in the local economy: still relevant in Rijeka, almost negligible in the Marseille metropolitan area. There is a temporal misalignment between the processes of deindustrialization in the 3 contexts: almost exhausted in Italian and French case; still in progress in the Croatian-Rijeka one. Single national and local dynamics can partly explain this difference. Naples gradually loses its status as an industrial city with a series of crises which start from the 70s favoring the factories' relocation to other areas of the region, outside the city perimeter or bringing them to closure (Becchi, 1989; Moricola, 2021). A turning point is represented by the end of *extraordinary state intervention* for Southern Italian regions' economy (*Cassa per il Mezzogiorno*) which brings to the closure of a significant part of public-owned industries between late 80s and early 90s. Marseille experienced its first industrial crisis in an even earlier period: between the 1950s and 1960s, in the context of the decline of the French colonial empire. The traditional *port-industrial complex* both importing and processing agricultural products then almost collapsed. Starting from the 1970s, new industrial areas outside the city center were realized, planned, and funded by national agencies together with a new port infrastructure (Fos-sur-Mer). The historic urban settlement thus undergoes a long phase of productive void that was partly "filled" until 2010 by projects related to innovation, research, the multimedia industry (Garnier, Zimmermann, 2006). In Rijeka, the start of industrialisation and development of the city is closely linked to the maritime and port dimension, with the proclamation of a *free port* in 1719. After the 'mythical phase' between the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, of Rijeka as a cosmopolitan space and a maritime projection of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the period between the two world wars proved to be complicated for the city's economy. After World War II, having overcome the impact of the exodus and post-war reconstruction, the city revived as the main port of the Yugoslav republic and as a major shipbuilding center. The transition from a planned economy, although traumatic, reduced but did not eliminate the importance of the industrial sector in the life of the city (Grubisa, 2005; Loria, 2005). The industrial history of the three cities has an undoubted effect on their position in the economic hierarchy of their respective countries: Napoli represents the main metropolitan area of the largest area lagging behind in economic development in Italy (GDP per capita in the province is 68% of the national average); the metropolis of Marseille, on the other hand, registers strong inequalities within it (with the area of greatest suffering within the capital city) but is basically included in an economically dynamic area; finally, Rijeka, despite its industrial crises, remains a region that is on average richer than the rest of the country, together with neighboring Istria. The 3 cities all experienced a long phase of sustained tourism growth over the last decade, interrupted by the pandemic crisis between 2020 and 2021: as of Q1 2022, tourism supply had not reached the level of the last pre-pandemic quarter (Q4 2019).

Tourism growth has been 'driven' by the development of short-term accommodations, rather than by a restructuring of the traditional tourism offer. Made possible by the development of 'sharing' platforms, a significant part of the flats in the 3 cities has shifted from the long-term or student/worker rental market to the tourist market. The data on tourist accommodation offered gives us a picture that leaves little room for 'sharing economy' models: most of the advertisements refer to entire flats (around 90% of the total in Marseille and Rijeka), managed from a fully entrepreneurial perspective.

Tourist development has been concentrated - most heavily in Napoli and Marseille - within the historic city centers, close to the old port infrastructures. These are neighborhoods that still present strong pockets of poverty and social marginality (Iovino, 2021), where entrenched communities and new residents of foreign origin coexist. In these contexts, characterized by fragile balances, the impact of the touristification of the last decade seems to have been incredibly profound.

### 3.1 Marseille

Developed in the late 1980s and declared an Operation of National Interest in 1995, the *Euroméditerranée* urban project was conceived as a way «to enable the metropolis (Marseille) to play its geostrategic role as a hub between Europe and the Mediterranean and to remedy a deteriorating economic and social situation» (*Rapport d'activités 2010*, p. 8). The main goal of the project is to attract tourists and investments in Marseille through the construction of an urban and Mediterranean identity: «developing and building the sustainable Mediterranean city of tomorrow» (Website of *Euroméditerranée. Stratégie*). *Euroméditerranée* covers 480 hectares: *Cité de la Méditerranée*, *Saint-Charles*, *Rue de la République*, *Belle-de-Mai* multimedia pole, *Arenc* and the Northern districts (13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th districts). In the project the port area is central, and everything revolves around the "Mediterranean": the name of the project "*Euroméditerranée*", the entire *Cité de la Méditerranée* along the port (3 km from the Fort Saint Jean to the tower of Zaha Hadid 'CMA-CGM'), the Mucem (Museum of the European and Mediterranean Civilizations) and the *Villa Méditerranée*, which is the Region PACA's auditorium. This supposed Mediterranean identity is the real protagonist of the project and the contents designed to increase tourist attractiveness are the main channels of communication through which this identity expands and consolidates. It is no coincidence that the area around the port, the *Cité de la Méditerranée* it is responsible for hosting the tourist-entertainment city on the seafront (Bertocello, Dubois, 2010), especially with the attractions related to the Mucem and Fort Sean Jean. These two spaces have become the symbol of both the city's Mediterranean identity turnaround and the tourist economy, they often appear in the main tourism promotion videos produced by the tourist office, so much so that it is possible to discern an overlapping of the city's image with that of the museum: «When we go somewhere to talk about Marseille, we talk about the Mucem» said Dominique Vlasto, deputy mayor in charge of tourism in 2016 (A.R., 2016).

Fig 1. The Mucem and Villa Méditerranée on the esplanade J4.



Source: Margherita Minnucci

The Mucem and the Villa Méditerranée are located on the esplanade J4 (Domaine Public Maritime - DPM) for a long time occupied by port activities, the J4 hangar, then affected by the Euro-Mediterranean project and went from being a port production area to a tourist production area. It is one of the few places in the city, in the central area, where it is possible to have more

direct contact with the sea, which, however, has not been made accessible by public decisions. But as De Certeau taught (1980), the strategies of institutions can be responded to with subversive tactics, deed, even though there is a ban on bathing, it is possible to find young adolescents bathing and trying to access the sea, as can be seen in the photo 1. Why is the Mediterranean so relevant in this urban project? As already highlighted by Brigitte Bertonecello and Jérôme Dubois first (2003), and Claire Bullen (2012) then, and as repeatedly stated in the documents published by the actors involved in the Euro-Mediterranean Project, the need to transform Marseille into a sustainable Mediterranean capital is a project of geographical repositioning. France sought to reposition itself politically by attempting to play a central role in the 1995 Barcelona process, the comprehensive partnership between the European Union and twelve countries (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority), which had as its aim to make the Mediterranean a common «common area of peace, stability and prosperity through the reinforcement of political dialogue, security, and economic, financial, social and cultural cooperation.» (Barcelona Declaration). Marseille was supposed to precisely serve this political strategy, to the point that the former President of the Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy, insisted that the ministerial summit of the Union for the Mediterranean be held in Marseille in 2008, and so it was. Over the years, the actors involved in the construction of this identity have produced numerous events, exhibitions, audio-visual and touristic products, and publications that have tried to justify the “Mediterranean nature” of Marseille.

The culmination of this narrative transformation was achieved when Marseille was named European Capital of Culture in 2013 and during that year hundreds of events took place on the theme of the Mediterranean. Moreover, in the same year, in the 2013, the AGAM – Planning Agency of the Marseille agglomeration – published: *Marseille et la Méditerranée*, in which it makes an historical, geographical, and economical insights of how Marseille is fundamentally “Mediterranean”. In this text, the Mediterranean history of Marseille starts from its Greek foundation, passing through the characteristics of semi-independence of Marseille in the 13th century that made it like the city-states, in particular the Italian ones, ending by mentioning the different groups of immigrants who arrived in Marseille and made it «cosmopolitan». Missing from this reconstruction are important periods that have conceptually related France and Marseille to the Mediterranean Sea, such as those pertaining to the violent colonisation. For a long time, the Mediterranean was, for the colonised peoples, especially for Algerians, synonymous with invention, and colonisation (Baghzouz, 2009). During the colonial era, a phrase circulated among the supporters and Soldiers of the French colonies: «the Mediterranean crosses France like the Seine crosses Paris». This short but effective phrase indicated the appropriation of the Mediterranean by the French, who legitimised this action by claiming the Mediterranean as a European sea, a crossroads of Greek and Roman culture that had to be “saved” from the North Africans and Muslims. Only after the conquest of the colonies to pacify relations, the Western Mediterranean was transformed from a “great divide” to a “junction sea” in the French imagination (Blais, Deprest, 2012). Indeed, in the Marseille context, there are citizens that are recognised as “Mediterranean”. As Claire Bullen (2012, p. 158) explains in her research «often, the term ‘Mediterranean’ was ‘racialised’, used as a kind of euphemism to refer to immigrants from the South of the Mediterranean basin, most of whom live in the so-called ‘disadvantaged neighbourhoods’». Once again, it is the white and European majority in France that labels the former colonised, imposing on them an identity imbued with colonial stereotypes. France seems to find itself in a continuous cognitive system of colonial conceptual creation and appropriation, which previously, during the age of conquest, had allowed it to invent and appropriate the Mediterranean. Nowadays in Marseille, with the Euro-Mediterranean project, French state recognises the immigrant or non-white citizen as Mediterranean, and appropriates this socially constructed identity, once again, for urban, political, strategic, and economic interests linked to the Barcelona process. It could be concluded that through the Mediterranean identity and the colonial stereotypes, the French state tries to pacify the relationship with other Mediterranean states gaining a symbolic advan-

tage without undermining the colonial symbolic ideals on which they are based and the racial discriminations that are repeated daily in France on this basis. We are faced with an example of how the narrative of a city for tourism and business purposes is never neutral or simply "economic" but is clothed with numerous political and socio-cultural meanings that intersect spaces and structural violence, often exacerbating them for subjectivities discriminated against on grounds of gender, class, and race.

### 3.2 Naples

The city of Naples has experienced unprecedented growth in tourism since 2011, even compared to the *Rinascimento Napoletano*<sup>6</sup> era of the 1990s. The growth in terms of both presences and accommodation facilities, is remarkable, the most sustained among the great Italian cities (Iovino, 2021). The growth in the availability of accommodation facilities was concentrated on the Short-Term-Rentals and in a delimited area, i.e., in the Greco-Roman part of the city and in the neighboring districts within the UNESCO area (Iovino, 2021). These are neighborhoods that, although central from a merely spatial point of view, still register important pockets of population in a condition of social and economic marginality, both Italian and foreign (Romano et al., 2022). The impact on the economy and public space in this part of the city has been rapid and intense: in commerce, with the proliferation of food-related establishments and the reduction of neighborhood and artisanal businesses (Viganoni, D'Alessandro, Autiero, 2019); in the real estate market, with an increase in prices of both purchases and long-term rents; and in the displacement of residents from various social backgrounds (Caputi, Fava, 2019). The representation of the city is at the center of this massive urban transformation. If the image during the waste crisis (2008-2011) was incompatible with the mass tourist experience, the new imagery accompanying the boom of the last decade nonetheless refers to an urban space that is not 'normalized', not fully 'pacified' and regulated. Mediating these representations are often products of the film industry (D'Alessandro, Viganoni, Sommella, 2015) or real promotional campaigns of international brands, such as the one carried out by Dolce&Gabbana in 2016, which led to a real temporary closure of public spaces in the city center (Rossini, Nervino, 2019). Authenticity is the common element of all these imaginaries: Napoli as an unique city, more than the others (Caputi, Fava, 2019), where to live different experiences compared to the standard of life of the European and Western city. In this sense, the example of the re-use of the "bassi", the historical settlement of the Neapolitan lower classes as accommodation for tourists, is emblematic (Berritto, Mazza, Punziano, 2019). The aspect of uniqueness is also frequently present in institutional tourism planning documents:

«The value of Naples is not the same as many other cities: Naples is unrepeatabe, with a personality of its own that is unmatched anywhere in the world! Let's aim for our diversity: A non-gentrified historic center; Rejection of Disneyization; Global us? No thanks.; A city that's all a show!; A DNA....without equal; It's called NAPOLETANITY»

The attractive aspect of local identity is synthesized in a Neapolitan exception to globality, in which the cosmopolitan, international dimension of the city remains in the background, re-framed by the *genius loci*. The Naples brand thus seems to revolve around its nature as a city of art, not yet mutated into a museum-city that is «characterized by its proverbial and scenic "daily life" of a population that still today, as in past centuries, lives and works within its enormous and beautiful historic center».<sup>7</sup>

6 By this we mean the period of the city government of Mayor Antonio Bassolino (1993 - 2000) and his first attempt at tourist and cultural enhancement of the city's historic center.

7 Comune di Napoli website, Tourism section: [www.comune.napoli.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/5802](http://www.comune.napoli.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/5802)

In the local political debate of the last decade, on the contrary, there is ample recourse to the idea of a metropolis at the center of the Mediterranean, capable of being a place of tolerance and aspiring to reconnect with the sea. This centrality is expressed in radical terms in the discourse of the previous mayor Luigi De Magistris, as for example in the proposal in 2019 of a "Neapolitan fleet" (*Flotta Partenopea*) capable of welcoming the ships of NGOs engaged in rescuing migrants: «Come towards the port of Naples you will be welcomed because [...] to people who are dying you have to welcome them, you have to help them. The port of Naples is open to cruise ships, it is open to fishing boats, it is open to ferries [...] it is open to children who are dying at sea»<sup>8</sup> From a much more pragmatic point of view, the Mediterranean role of the city of Naples is a central vision also for the new mayor, Gaetano Manfredi: « Naples must resume the role it historically deserves, that of a great European metropolis. To the traditional role of crossroads of Mediterranean cultures and civilisations that it has always exercised by virtue of its geographical location and its millennial history must now, as it has in the past, regain a strong presence in the context of the great capitals of continental Europe<sup>9</sup>.» It is extremely interesting how, in this passage opening the electoral programme, the European identity of the city is to be 'reacquired' and to be combined with consolidated Mediterranean characteristics of exchange and mixing of cultures.

The maritime and port dimension in the promotion of tourism in Naples, however, is still not very relevant. It is significant in this sense that the main tourism planning document (Comune di Napoli, 2017) never refers to Naples as a port city (except for cruise traffic) and to its seaside/maritime nature. The problematic aspect of the city with the sea and the port moves in parallel with an urban transformation that is not fully completed and, from some points of view, contradictory.

Fig. 2 Main interventions realised or planned on the Neapolitan waterfront.



Source: Graphic designed by Dario Fiorentino on authors' elaboration

On the one hand, the two large potential coastlines to the West (Bagnoli) and to the East (San Giovanni a Teduccio) of the city have been awaiting interventions - in both cases for decades - making them suitable for bathing or, at least, for leisure and tourism. In the case of the East coast,

8 Statement on LA7 Tv channel, 07/01/2019

9 Electoral Programme of Gaetano Manfredi, 2021 p.2: [www.manfredisindaco.it/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Programma%20Manfredi.pdf](http://www.manfredisindaco.it/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Programma%20Manfredi.pdf)

these visions clash with the expansion of the commercial port (*Darsena di Levante*) and the oil companies' proposals to restore new infrastructure for the storage of hydrocarbons (*Vigliena LNG Depot*). In the city center, the most impactful interventions carried out, such as the pedestrianization of the *Lungomare Caracciolo/Via Partenope* promenade and the reef built for the America's Cup regattas, did not involve the commitment of large economic resources, nor a structural transformation of urban space. The restyling of the seafront, as well as the reorganization of the passenger port, still await the realization of long-planned projects. The difficulty of representing a fully maritime Naples thus seems to follow the difficulty of overcoming the industrial-commercial function that the Neapolitan waterfront had throughout the twentieth century. The denied (or reduced) access to public use of the sea and city beaches in this case seems to represent an obstacle even for the construction of a new tourist imaginary.

### 3.3 Rijeka

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the post-Yugoslav, independent Croatian Republic addressed quite straightforwardly the revision and dissemination of its national identity in terms of public communication and branding (Kotler, Gertner 2002; Hall, 2002, 1999). Part of the strategy of (re)building a post-Balkan Croatian identity, which was functional to the ambition of EU integration and Western alignment, is a "new" relationship with the Mediterranean. Interestingly, in the public promotion of such a "Mediterranean-ess" there is a strategic removal of historical records, such as the Ottoman, the Yugoslav and, to some extent, even the Venetian identity (when associated to Italian identity and Fascism). It is, in other words, a Mediterranean deprived of its Eastern and Southern poles, negatively constructed through the exclusion of supposedly "non-European" features along an "orientalist" representation where violence, warfare and chaos are relegated to the "Balkans" and the Southern shore of the Mediterranean does not even appear in the picture. Such a representation clearly synthesized by a famous advertisement of the Croatian tourism board reflects a hyper-real image of the Mediterranean. That is to say «the Mediterranean as it once was»: cool, neat, and almost without people. (Fig. 3)

Fig. 3 Advertisement of the Croatian tourism.



Source: The Croatian Tourist Board

In this context, the case of the city of Rijeka sticks out as quite peculiar. In fact, the history of Rijeka is the one of a crisis of a late 19<sup>th</sup> century industrial and multi-cultural city, which was still the major Adriatic port in Yugoslavia and entered a phase of radical decline following the end of Yugoslavia. Against this present crisis, the local political elite indulge memories of “golden years” of Austria-Hungary, when “Fiume” was a major hub serving a vast multinational inland and connecting it with the rest of the world through ferry lines and cargo ships. That city, the nowadays disappointed elite claim, thrived on the life of industrious diaspora communities, the commercial know-how, the diffused secular mindset, and the widespread cosmopolitan multiculturalism. Even after the end of the Empire, despite the cultural and economic decline experienced with fascism, industry was always a stronghold of city identity. Likewise, in socialist Yugoslavia, the industrial identity of the city was reinforced by an ideological investment in its cultural autonomy and specific identity in the context of a celebration of transnational “brotherhood” based on labour (Svorinić, 2021). Therefore, it is not surprising that the necessary regeneration of Rijeka should have started from a remembrance of its industrial and cosmopolitan past, as the local political elite like to remind. From this perspective, the candidacy, and the fulfilment of the project « Rijeka 2020: port of Diversity » to celebrate the city as European cultural capital 2020 takes a quite special meaning. Likewise, the same representation is recognizable in the way the city candidacy is explained in the official documents: «Nestled between the *Mediterranean*, Central European and Eastern European influences, Rijeka has been part of as many as seven different countries over the past century of its development. A small-scale Europe of sorts, it has become a place for dynamic life, a symbol of the spirit of libertarian and progressive ideas, and a city where everyone is always welcome» (Rijeka2020.eu, 2020). As a matter of fact, the public communication related to the Culture Capital event resonate all quite well with the words of the city mayor, with the official documents and the mainstream media. Rijeka is described as: «Rijeka is today a multicultural and multi-ethnic city, in which *no one's diversity is rejected* and pushed to the margin but rather supported. *Port* and *diversity* are two important determinants of Rijeka in every sense. These two concepts describe us both as a city, i.e., as an urban environment, but also as a society». And finally, from the same source, the: «Port of Diversity is based definitely and naturally on the European Union's motto 'United in Diversity'» Despite the strong narrative set by the port of diversity project, there are also some critical voices and meaningful complains, such as the one of Moreno Vrancich, president of the Assembly of the Community of Italians of Rijeka, that regrets the initial rejection of all the cultural projects submitted by his Community to the Company Rijeka 2020 to be part of the Capital of Culture. Also, Vrancich explains that there is no trace in the narration of port diversity project that more than half of the population of Rijeka was Italian and left the city, in a large and painful exodus. (Osservatorio Causaso, 2020). It comes from the above that despite a powerful and articulated rhetoric of “diversity” as a backbone of urban regeneration, the Capital of Culture narrative especially emphasized a difference between Rijeka and the rest of the country, the latter depicted through subtraction as pervaded by ethnic and discriminatory (Balkan) nationalism. Skillfully using a blend of Mittel-European and Mediterranean rhetoric, local elites of Rijeka seemingly acted to relegate ethnic conflicts and violence to a Balkan imagery, thus producing a local, Mediterranean (Adriatic) de-orientalized urban identity based on a perennial spirit of tolerance and open mindedness. However, in doing so, they often forget the place Austro-Hungarian authoritarianism, fascist political violence, partisan retaliation (i.e foibe), tentative ethnic cleansing and forced mass migration, had in the turbulent history of the city. Not to mention the fact that such a Mediterranean, made of laborious transnational European communities, is just a very selected frame out of a much larger picture.



## Conclusions

We decided to investigate our cases focusing on the outcomes of some major architectural and/or development projects. This way, the exploration of political rhetoric and public communication connected to projects and/or events allowed for the emergence of meaningful categories to break down the narrative of Mediterranean-ness and its exclusionary outcomes. Particularly, the ambivalent feature of the Mediterranean is played out in the colonial heritage and in the construction of tourism as an asymmetrical practice, based on exogenous, imposed categories. In this perspective, the gentrification process of the port-city displays a “false” neutrality because it plays out a civilizational turn, from deprivation, chaos and uneasiness to beauty, politeness, and domesticated transnationalism. In the case of Marseille, this shift takes the form of instrumentalising the “Mediterranean” dimension for political and economic reasons, without considering the colonial past and the daily racist violence. Similarly, but still with significant differences, also in Rijeka the Mediterranean is represented as a European, or better “Mittel-European” space embedded in the “port-city of diversity” (whatever that would mean) and localized in the Roman, Venitian (but not Italian) and Austro-Hungarian Adriatic version of a continental Mediterranean deprived of its oriental and non European dimension. Finally, in Naples the Mediterranean takes on the appearance of genius, creativity, and welcoming attitude, whilst the relation of the city to the sea is unexpressed. A comparative outlook at the insights into the Mediterranean narratives of the three cases leads us to point out a number of categories, which could work both as tool to operationalize the Mediterranean branding in this first phase of exploration and to start operationalizing the concepts to translate into new research tools such as surveys or interview structures for a next field based research phase. These categories are 1) Localism 2) Geopolitics 3) Lifestyle 4) Nature 5) Cultural heritage 6) hospitality 7) Diversity 8) Cosmopolitanism. Elements of localism, geopolitics, lifestyle, cultural heritage, and diversity can be found in all the three cases, although in different semantic contents. For instance, localism, lifestyle and cultural heritage are exploited not only to describe the characteristics that would make the three cities part of a larger, imagined Mediterranean context, but also to construct a unique image of the city that could be sold to the tourism industry. Geopolitical connotation of the Mediterranean in Naples is evident only up to the Second World War with the role played by the harbor in terms of maritime communication with former colonies in Libia and Eastern Africa and the choice of the city for hosting the Overseas permanent exhibition “Mostra d’Oltremare” in 1940. In Marseille instead the idea of Mediterranean as a tool for the foreign policy of the country is still present, strictly connected with colonialism legacy and the current euro-mediterranean projections of French government. In Rijeka finally this image does possess a local, anti-balkan flavor, constructed also emphasizing a specific period of the city as a free port withing the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Diversely, nature is basically lacking from the Mediterranean imaginary in Naples and is only evoked in terms of absence for the lack of contact between people and seawater for pollution, decaying waterfronts and vehicles traffic. Hospitality, in turn, is not part of the rhetoric in Marseille whereas cosmopolitanism does not have a place in the Mediterranean representation of Naples, where the local notion of “napoletanità” seems to incorporate all other differences. Diversity and cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, seem to feature strongly in the contexts of Rijeka and Marseille to suggest a welcoming and pacified openness, the intensity of the narrative with respect to these two elements seems particularly significant when considering exclusionary practices and symbolic violence in both cities. They seem to be elements mobilised precisely to conceal the dynamics of social and symbolic expulsion of certain groups, and this would explain the strong emphasis. Certainly, the categories of above pave the way for further research action, such as text mining on documents and larger set of data or the organization of focus groups with public decision makers, with the aim to disentangle the complexity of such a “false beautiful theme”.

## References

- A.R (2016, May 12). *Marseille: Le Mucem, une forte attractivité touristique*, 20 minutes. URL: [www.20minutes.fr/marseille/1844679-20160512-marseille-mucem-forte-attractivite-touristique](http://www.20minutes.fr/marseille/1844679-20160512-marseille-mucem-forte-attractivite-touristique) (last access 5 June 2022).
- Baghzouz, A. (2009). *Du Processus de Barcelone à l'Union pour la Méditerranée: une vision d'Algérie*, Outre-Terre, (n° 23), (pp. 139-151). DOI: 10.3917/oute.023.0139. URL: [www.cairn.info/revue-outre-terre1-2009-3-page-139.htm](http://www.cairn.info/revue-outre-terre1-2009-3-page-139.htm)
- Becchi, A. (1989) *Napoli contro Napoli. Città come economia e città come potere*. Meridiana, n. 5. (pp. 143-167).
- Berritto, A., Mazza, R., Punziano, G. (2019) *Tradizione, informalità, innovazione: i bassi e il turismo a Napoli tra dimensione esperienziale e nuova forma di rivendicazione del locale*. Urbanistica Informazioni, n. 4. (pp. 6-12).
- Bertoncello, B., Dubois, J. (2010) *Marseille Euroméditerranée, accélérateur de métropole: Accélérateur de métropol*. Parenthèses: Marseille.
- Bertoncello, B., Rodrigues-Malta, R. (2003) *Marseille versus Euroméditerranée / Marseille versus the Euromediterranean*. Annales de Géographie, vol. 112, no. 632, (pp. 424–36) JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/23456418](http://www.jstor.org/stable/23456418).
- Blais, H., Deprest, F. (2012). *The Mediterranean, a territory between France and Colonial Algeria: imperial constructions*. European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire, 19:1. (pp. 33-57), DOI: 10.1080/13507486.2012.643608.
- Broeze, F. (1989). *From the Periphery to the Mainstream: The Challenge of Australia's Maritime History*. Great Circle, 11, no. 1. (pp. 1–14).
- Bullen, C. (2012) *Marseille, ville méditerranéenne?*, Rives méditerranéennes, 42 | URL : [journals.openedition.org/rives/4211](http://journals.openedition.org/rives/4211); DOI : [doi.org/10.4000/rives.4211](http://doi.org/10.4000/rives.4211).
- Caputi, A., Fava, A. (2019). *Napoli in vendita tra turismo e privatizzazioni*. Critica Urbana, n. 7.
- Clic, C. (2020). Rijeka 2020: *Port Of Diversity*. URL:[www.clicproject.eu/rijeka-2020-port-of-diversity/](http://www.clicproject.eu/rijeka-2020-port-of-diversity/). (last access 5 June 2020).
- Comune di Napoli. (2017) *Piano marketing strategico per lo sviluppo turistico della Destinazione Napoli 2020*. Destinazione Napoli 2020: Executive Summary.
- Dassovich, M., (2003). *L'Impero e il Golfo. Una ricerca bibliografica sulla politica degli Asburgo verso le provincie meridionali dell'impero negli anni 1717–1814 (vol 1) 1815–1866 (vol 2)*, Udine: Del Bianco Editore.
- De Certeau, M. (1980). *L'Invention du quotidien, tome 1: arts de faire, UGE, Paris, coll 10/18*. Gallimard. Paris.
- Del Bianco, U. (1982) *Il Lloyd Austriaco e la marina postale dell'Austria e dell'Ungheria. La rete austriaca nel Levante ed il ruolo della Società Triestina*, Udine: Del Bianco Editore.
- Driessen, H. (2005). *Mediterranean port cities: Cosmopolitanism reconsidered*. History and Anthropology, 1 (16). (pp. 129-130).
- Dubin, L.C. (1999). *The Port Jews of Habsburg Trieste: Absolutist Politics and Enlightenment Culture*, Stanford University Press: Stanford.
- Eurocities (2020). *Port of diversity*. URL:[eurocities.eu/stories/port-of-diversity/](http://eurocities.eu/stories/port-of-diversity/). (last access 5 June 2022).
- Euroméditerranée Stratégie. URL:[www.euromediterranee.fr/strategie](http://www.euromediterranee.fr/strategie). (last access 5 June 2022).
- Fiume, G. (2016). *Mediterraneo. Un falso bel tema*. L'Indice, n.2. (pp. 12).
- Garnier, J., Zimmermann J., (2006). L'aire métropolitaine marseillaise et les territoires de l'industrie. *Géographie, économie, société*, n. 2: 215-238.
- Gotham, F. K. (2018). Assessing and Advancing Research on Tourism Gentrification. *Tourism Review*, 13, DOI: [doi.org/10.4000/viatourism.2653](http://doi.org/10.4000/viatourism.2653).
- Grubisa, D. (2005) *Politička misao*, Vol. XLII, No. 5, pp. 55–74.
- Hall, D., (2002). Brand Development, Tourism and National Identity: The Re-Imaging of former Yugoslavia. *Journal of Brand Management*, 9, 323-332.
- Hall, D. (1999). *Destination Branding, Niche Marketing and National Image Projection*. Central and Eastern Europe, 5, 227-37.
- Helmreich, S. (2009) *Alien Ocean: Anthropological Voyages in Microbial Sea*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Herzfeld, M. (1984). *The Horns of the Mediterraneanist Dilemma*. American Ethnologist 11, 3, 439–54.
- Horden, P. (2005). *Mediterranean Excuses: Historical Writing on the Mediterranean since Braudel*. History and Anthropology, 1,16, 25–30.
- Horden, P., Purcell, N. (2010). *The Corrupting Sea. A study of Mediterranean History*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Iovino, G. (2021). *Affitti turistici a breve termine nelle città d'arte. La "airificazione" di Napoli e i suoi impatti*. Bollettino della Associazione Italiana di Cartografia, 172, 4-19.
- Kidwai, A. (1992). *Conceptual and methodological issues: ports, port cities and port hinterlands*, in Indu Banga, ed., *Ports and Their Hinterlands in India, 1700–1950*. (pp. 17–22) New Delhi: Manohar.
- Kotler, P., Gertner, D., (2002). *Country as Brand, Product, and Beyond: A Place Marketing and Brand Management Perspective*. Journal of Brand Management, 9,62. (pp. 249-261).
- Leontidou, L. (1990) *The Mediterranean City in Transition: Social Change and Urban Development*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Loria, E. (2005) *Fiume. Crocevia di popoli e culture*, Storia del mondo n. 37.
- Moricola, G. (2021), *Il tramonto di un'idea. Deindustrializzazione e questione sociale a Napoli nella crisi degli anni Settanta*. In Gloria Chianese (edited by). *Napoli e la giunta rossa*. Atti del convegno "Il volto della città di Napoli e l'Attività dell'amministrazione Valenzi (1975-1983)", (pp. 47-60). Milano: Mimesis.
- Rapport d'activités, Euroméditerranée, 2010, Website of Euroméditerranée:*

- URL:staging.euromediterranee.fr/sites/default/files/2018-06/rapport\_activites\_2010-bassedef.pdf (last access 5 June 2022).
- Rijeka 2020 (2020) *About the project*. URL:rijeka2020.eu/en/about-the-project/. (last access 5 June 2022).
- Romano, O., Coco, A., Palazzo, L., Sabatino, P. (2022). Southern Italian Peripheries at the Ballot Box. Continuity and Innovation in Electoral Behaviours in Three Southern Italian Cities during Post-Crisis Decade (2008–2019). *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 27(1), 92-124 DOI 10.1080/1354571X.2021.1950341.
- Rossini, F., Nervino, E. (2019) City Branding and Public Space. An empirical analysis of Dolce & Gabbana's Alta Moda event in Naples. *The Journal of Public Space*, 4, 4, (pp. 61-82).
- Schmitt, C. (2001) *Land und Meer*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Steinberg, P. E. (2001) *The Social Construction of the Ocean*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Svorinić, D. (2021) *Raccolta di atti del convegno scientifico internazionale per i 100 anni della fondazione dello stato libero di Fiume*, Fiume-Rijeka: Associazione Stato Libero di Fiume.
- Vale G.(2020) Fiume capitale europea della cultura. Balcani causaso.org.  
URL: www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Croazia/Fiume-capitale-europea-della-cultura-199504 (last access 5 June 2022).
- Viganoni, L., D'Alessandro, L., Autiero, A. (2019), *La "svolta" verso cibo e turismo: via dei Tribunali e via Benedetto Croce*, in L. Viganoni (edited by), *Commercio e consumo nelle città che cambiano. Napoli, città medie, spazi esterni*. (pp. 383- 408) Milano: FrancoAngeli.
- Yin, R. K. (2014). *Case Study Research Design and Methods* (5th ed.). Thousand Oaks: CA: Sage.